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Etienne de Villiers, more than other theologians, elaborates on basic elements of a Christian 
ethics of responsibility. He distinguishes between retrospective and prospective responsibility. 
The prospective aspect attracted awareness after the nuclear accident in the Fukushima 
reactors on 11 March 2011. The question on how to respond in an ethically responsible 
manner to catastrophic risks was put back on the agenda. The article takes up this question 
and discusses the answer given in the international debate by the introduction of the 
‘precautionary principle’. The principle is described with its background in the ‘heuristics of 
fear’, proposed by the philosopher Hans Jonas. Four criticisms are discussed in detail relating 
to the problems of scientific uncertainty, the burden of proof, the weight of damages and the 
perils of precaution. That leads to a reformulation of the precautionary principle as a concrete 
element within an ethics of responsibility. 
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Like no other theologian, Etienne de Villiers discussed over the last number of years the ways in 
which Christian theology has taken up newer debates on an ethics of responsibility (see De Villiers 
2002, 2003, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2010, 2011a, 2011b). He analyses the importance as well as the 
limits of Hans Jonas’ The Imperative of Responsibility (Jonas 1979, 1984) for the development of an 
ethics of responsibility in philosophy as well as in theology. He comes to the clear conclusion that 
responsibility is not, as Jonas proposes, a basic ethical principle in itself but that it presupposes an 
idea of the ethically good. Likewise, De Villiers emphasises that ethics are not to be restricted – as 
in the case of Jonas – to the question of possible future consequences of present actions. 
Therefore De Villiers warns not to introduce, following Jonas, a too narrow concept of 
responsibility into Christian ethics. However, he gives good reasons why one could still work 
with this concept in ethics. He observes that the move of the ethical language from ‘duty’ to 
‘responsibility’ is not coincidental but indicates a fundamental change in the understanding of 
moral obligations that relates not simply to external norms but to convictions accepted by the 
responsible person herself. He includes Jonas’ proposal into a broader concept insofar as the new 
challenges of modern technological developments make it necessary to supplement the notion 
of retrospective responsibility by the notion of prospective responsibility. Whereas in the case of 
retrospective responsibility, events in the past and their consequences are attributed to a person 
or to persons, prospective responsibility relates to the task of preventing humans and nature 
from being harmed in the future by present actions and of providing by present actions desirable 
future conditions for the life of humans and nature. It further ascribes this task to a person or 
persons or to an institution or institutions (De Villiers 2002). 
Following De Villiers, we have to bear in mind the warning not to isolate the aspect of prospective 
responsibility. We rather need to enlarge the ethical perspective and to take into consideration 
the future effects of present actions. This was not only proposed by Has Jonas, but already six 
decades before him, the sociologist Max Weber proposed the same under the title of an ethics of 
responsibility (Weber 1994). Today, specific challenges make an elaboration on this aspect of an 
ethics of responsibility urgent. When I try to contribute to this task with the following pages, I do 
so in deep gratitude to Etienne de Villiers for his continuous work on this important issue and for 
his personal friendship.
On rational responses to catastrophic risks
On 28 February 2011, Evelyn Fox Keller, the well-known physicist and professor for history and 
philosophy of science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and then fellow at the 
Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS), presented a STIAS lecture on the topic: ‘What 
is a rational response to catastrophic risk?’ (Fox Keller 2011). The main catastrophic risk Evelyn 
Fox Keller discussed in her reflections was global warming. Her criticism was directed towards the 
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fact that many experts do not take climate change seriously 
enough. She feared that a limitation of global warming to 
two degrees Celsius had already become unreachable, and 
she asked how the community of experts contributed to that 
development. 
Therefore, she discussed the question whether or not the 
expertise of the experts is the only way to obtain a realistic 
anticipation of possible events in the future. For the 
distinction between the different ways in which experts and 
ordinary people address those future events, she followed 
Gerd Gigerenzer, a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for 
Human Development in Berlin, in using a stunning example 
(Gigerenzer 2007).
The example refers to a ball player catching a ball. Richard 
Dawkins (1976), in his famous book The Selfish Gene, offered 
a description of how a ball player catches a ball:
When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again, 
he behaves as if he has solved a set of differential equations in 
predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may neither know nor 
care what a differential equation is, but this does not affect 
his skill with the ball. At some subconscious level, something 
functionally equivalent to the mathematical calculations is going 
on. (p. 6)
Evidently Dawkins follows a monistic epistemology and 
therefore assumes that the ball player performs differential 
equations, otherwise he would not be able to catch the ball. 
This assumption, however, is in a striking contrast with how 
ball players actually proceed. As Gerd Gigerenzer explains, 
ball players do not calculate the ball’s trajectory; they use 
different heuristics that are both easier and more effective. 
Amongst others, they use what Gigerenzer calls the ‘gaze 
heuristics’. 
The gaze heuristics are a stunningly simple rule of thumb 
that enables the player to be at that precise spot just when 
the ball lands (and hence to catch the ball), but it does not 
enable him or her to predict where it will land. It requires 
nothing more than fixing one’s eye on the ball when it is high 
and running in a direction that maintains a constant angle 
between the line of sight and the ground as it comes down. 
This gaze heuristic does not require differential equations but 
refers only to the fact of gravity that is built into the adaptive 
capacities of every human being.
As the example shows, it would not be correct to call the gaze 
heuristics emotional and to call only the use of differential 
equations rational. Rather the gaze heuristics has its own 
rationality – a rationality that has to do with processes in 
which we are involved. Therefore, we ask ourselves whether 
we shall be at the right spot before the ball lands. 
Evelyn Fox Keller applies this insight to the question: What 
kind of anticipations of the future has to be taken seriously? 
She proposes to take anticipations that follow a ‘gaze 
heuristics’ as seriously as those following the ‘differential 
equation’ or other forms of expert calculations. She expects 
rational anticipations from both ordinary people and experts. 
In this way, she rehabilitates a philosophical proposal going 
back to Hans Jonas’ Imperative of Responsibility (Jonas 1979, 
1984). At the centre of this book stands a new categorical 
imperative. Instead of Kant’s categorical imperative that 
obliges us to prove whether the maxim of our action can be 
made into a generalised or universal law, Jonas proposes as 
categorical imperative: ‘Act so that the effects of your action 
are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life’ 
(Jonas 1984:11). 
Such an imperative presupposes, on the one hand, a duty 
to contribute to the permanence of genuine human life. 
Although Jonas declares that he does not want to refer to 
religious ethics but prefers to rely on a philosophy of nature 
that bridges the ‘chasm between scientifically ascertainable 
“is” and morally binding “ought”’ (Jonas 1984:X), he 
nevertheless returns to the ‘sanctity of life’ (Jonas 1984:26) 
as the decisive reference point for his categorical imperative. 
He uses for that purpose an interesting kind of implicit or 
‘negative’ theology following the Jewish idea that God as 
creator restricts himself from intervening in his creation and 
respects the freedom with which he endowed it (Jonas 1987). 
Evidently Jonas extends to the future the commandment not 
to kill or more generally the ethical principle not to do harm. 
Etienne de Villiers rightly clarifies that there is no difference 
whether the imperative not to harm is applied to the present 
or to the future. 
Jonas’ imperative obliges, on the other hand, one to anticipate 
the (possible) effects of your actions in the future. Therefore, 
Jonas asks for a ‘predictive science of the long-range effects 
of technological action’ (Jonas 1984:27ff.). The problem is that 
this predictive science depends on a heuristics that helps 
science to know what it is searching for. Human beings know 
about the sanctity of life only because they experience that 
they are able to execute deadly violence against each other. 
In this sense, the dispute between Cain and Abel is prior to 
the explicit knowledge about the commandment not to kill. 
Human beings know the value of truth only because they 
are aware of lies. They develop an ethics of responsibility for 
distant contingencies only because they know what they fear. 
The perception of what to avoid is a necessary precondition 
to understand what kind of precaution has to be taken. This 
precaution has to take into consideration the possible effects 
of present actions that endanger the prospects of human 
life. Jonas firmly argues in this context for the prevalence 
of the bad over the good prognosis. He does not follow a 
philosophy of hope that gives priority to the good prognosis 
but a philosophy of responsibility that obliges on to avoid 
actions that in their consequence could endanger ‘the 
permanence of genuine human life’. 
It is important to notice at this point that Jonas does not favour 
a zero-risk-fantasy. On the contrary: It is the inevitability of 
risks that leads him to his heuristics of fear as well as to the 
imperative to avoid as many risks as possible that endanger 
the permanence of genuine human life. 
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Jonas has in mind the difference between imminent or 
present dangers and distant or future dangers, between 
dangers with a high probability and dangers with a lower 
or unknown probability. Because his focus is on dangers that 
are relevant to the future of humankind, he argues to take 
seriously also the fears that relate to the distant future and to 
take them into account even if experts attribute to them only 
a low probability. 
So his heuristics of fear imply already what was called only a 
few years after the publication of his book the ‘precautionary 
principle’ and what was in the following years mostly applied 
to environmental politics. The Rio de Janeiro Summit in 1992 
defines the ‘precautionary approach’ in Principle 15 of its 
‘Agenda 21’ as follows:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation. 
(United Nations General Assembly 1992)
And that indeed was also Evelyn Fox Keller’s conclusion 
on 28 February 2011 in Stellenbosch. Following Jonas’ 
‘heuristics of fear’, she asked for ‘new ways of thinking’ that 
prepare us better than our usual expertise ‘for actions that are 
appropriate to the threats we currently face’. 
 
Lessons from Fukushima
Eleven days after Evelyn Fox Keller’s STIAS-Lecture, 
11 March 2011, an earthquake and a following tsunami hit 
the Japanese main island Honshu. The consequences of this 
natural disaster included especially the prefecture Fukushima 
in which a big nuclear power plant is situated. The strength 
of the earthquake exceeded the level of natural events for 
which this nuclear power plant was designed. Four of the 
six reactor blocs were destroyed. A core meltdown followed 
that set free radioactive materials to the amount of 10% – 
20% of the Chernobyl accident of 1986. Between 100 000 and 
150 000 people were evacuated. The exact number of human 
casualties is unknown. Several hundreds of thousands of 
animals, left on the respective farms, died from hunger. 
Contamination and devastation will endure for decades. 
After some hesitation, the event was given the highest rank 
in the gravity of nuclear accidents, namely stage seven. An 
evaluation of the details showed that there were several early 
warnings that related to possible risks in the Fukushima 
reactors, but these risks were not taken seriously enough by 
the operating enterprise. 
After the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe in 1986, it was 
argued that it took place in a country – the Ukraine – in 
which general standards of security were not met. In more 
advanced industrial states, a comparable accident would 
therefore not happen. The Fukushima event nonetheless 
happened in a technologically highly advanced country. 
What is more, is that it happened in the country that, behind 
the USA and France, is number three amongst the leading 
producers of nuclear energy. Therefore, the argument that, 
in countries with many nuclear power plants, an event 
comparable with the Chernobyl accident could not happen 
had lost its credibility. A revision of views seemed to become 
necessary. 
The debate on nuclear energy has been raging for decades 
now. Related to the discussions on global warming, it was 
argued that, in light of the policies on climate change, the use 
of nuclear energy would be unavoidable because no carbon 
dioxide is emitted through the production of nuclear energy. 
This perspective was, however, shattered by the Fukushima 
event. For countries with a high economic involvement in 
nuclear energy like the US or an extremely high dependency 
on nuclear energy like France (78%), it is extremely difficult 
to correct their energy politics. Such a switch is incomparably 
easier for countries where nuclear energy contributes to only 
a small percentage of the general energy supply. Examples 
of the latter are China with 2% or South Africa with 5% from 
its single nuclear power plant with two reactors in Koeberg 
near Cape Town. I wonder how the debate in South Africa 
will develop further after its formal commitment to a Green 
Economy Accord in November 2011 where the emphasis is 
on energy efficiency, renewable energy and a low carbon 
economy. Things are quite different in Japan, which has, 
behind France, the highest dependency on nuclear energy in 
the world, that is 30%. The fact that it is the same country 
where the first nuclear bombings were exerted in 1945 
provides an additional tragic commentary on the Fukushima 
event and forms an serious background for the ongoing 
debate over nuclear energy in Japan. 
In Germany, the dependency on nuclear energy is a little bit 
lower than in Japan, namely 23%. In the German case, the 
irony is that, in 2000, the then government came to a ‘nuclear 
consensus’ with the goal to terminate the use of nuclear 
energy in Germany at the beginning of the 2020s. In 2010, 
however, under obvious pressure of the energy industry, this 
consensus was revoked, and the time limits for the existing 
reactors were extended to the 2030s. Six months after this 
decision, the Fukushima accident happened. In a very quick 
response, Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to terminate 
the relatively old reactors, to organise a stress test for even 
the younger ones and to ask for the advice of an ad hoc Ethics 
Committee on Safe Energy Supply (see Ethikkommission 
Sichere Energieversorgung 2011). 
Critical objections were raised against the founding of 
this Ethics Committee because it was expected to return 
to the earlier ‘nuclear consensus’ and to give an external 
authorisation for the revision of a decision for which the 
energy industry had lobbied very strongly. That is indeed 
what happened. The committee argued that the position of 
moderate advocates and radical critics of the use of nuclear 
energy could be reconciled by bringing an end to this form 
of energy supply in the early 2020s, exactly the date of the 
former ‘nuclear consensus’. 
Original Research
doi:10.4102/ve.v33i2.736http://www.ve.org.za
Page 4 of 6
How much ‘ethics’ was behind this rather tactical advice? 
The committee’s report develops at least two important 
ethical perspectives. The one has to do with the priority of 
energy efficiency and a careful use of energy over the debate 
on the different energy resources. The other has to do with 
the evaluation of future risk.
For the evaluation of future risks, experts normally ‘assess 
the risk of some hazard by computing (a) the magnitude of 
the hazard, and (b) the probability that it will occur, and (c) 
multiplying the two numbers together’ (Fox Keller 2011:1). 
A consequence of this kind of mathematical calculation may 
be that hazards with limited magnitude but high probability 
are calculated as more important than high risks with 
low probability. This kind of calculation is justified by the 
argument that zero risk is in any case impossible. 
The debate on nuclear energy followed this line to a great 
extent, putting aside the open question of the safe, permanent 
storage of radioactive material over an unimaginable long 
time. The German Ethics Committee on Safe Energy Supply 
argued that high risks, even in the case of a comparably 
low probability, can be valued with a high priority in the 
political decision-making process. It is not less rational, the 
Committee argued, to put the extent of a possible catastrophe 
in the centre of political awareness than to assess the risk by 
multiplying its magnitude with the probability that it will 
occur (Ethikkommission Sichere Energieversorgung 2011:29–
36). That meant, at the same time, that the assessment of 
future risks lies not only in the hands of experts applying 
their kind of mathematical calculation but also in the hands 
of an informed public that judges from an ethical perspective 
the risks that are at stake. It is also not irrational when 
political decisions take into account such a deliberative 
process together with the information provided by experts. 
Controversies around the 
precautionary principle 
The German Ethics Committee on Safe Energy Supply gave 
the precautionary principle a specific turn and argued for 
the preferential option to avoid high risks even if only a 
low probability is attributed to them. That leads us to a final 
discussion of some controversies around the precautionary 
principle itself. 
Scientific uncertainty
The first formal statement on the precautionary principle 
can be found, as already mentioned, in Principle 15 of the 
Rio-Declaration of 1992. It was the same year in which the 
European Union included the precautionary principle 
into the treaty on the working procedures of the European 
institutions, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Its Article 130r 
states under No. 2: 
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level 
of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in 
the various regions of the Community. It shall be based on the 
precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive 
action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 
(European Union 1992)
As at the same time, in Principle 15 of the Rio Summit and 
also in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the idea of scientific 
uncertainty plays a crucial role. The European Commission 
(2000) explained this aspect as follows some years later: 
The precautionary principle applies where scientific evidence 
is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary 
scientific evaluation indicates that there are reasonable grounds 
for concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the 
environment, human, animal or plant health may be inconsistent 
with the high level of protection by the EU. (n.p.)
This strong emphasis on scientific uncertainty needs a 
commentary. In this specific context, scientific uncertainty 
has not only to do with the notorious fallibility of science or 
with the experience of continuous scientific self-revisions. 
In those cases to which the precautionary principle apply, 
scientific expertise relates to future events. With regard to 
the future, the uncertainty is different from that of science in 
general. Uncertainty concerning the future has to do with the 
modes of time – past, present and future – and the modalities 
of necessity, reality and possibility (see Picht 1980). Whereas 
the past is related to the modality of necessity and the present 
is related to the modality of reality, the future is related to 
the modality of possibility. Therefore, all scientific expertise 
on the future is expertise on the possible and therefore of an 
inherent uncertain nature. 
However, there are scientific statements on the future with 
higher or lower probability. Therefore, all applications of the 
precautionary principle have to be open for revision. That is 
the case as far as scientific statements on the probability of 
future events play an important role. It is also the case as far 
as the ‘heuristics of fear’ or other kinds of ‘gaze heuristics’ 
are applied. In both cases, better insight can lead to a 
revision of previous judgments, or the progress of science 
and technology can lead to a new evaluation of risks and 
opportunities. Therefore, the precautionary principle has to 
be applied in a process which is open for revisions. 
The burden of proof 
To restrict the use of the precautionary principle to the aspect 
of scientific uncertainty seems to be too one-dimensional. 
Another aspect was put to the fore when the principle was 
explained from the perspective of the burden of proof. The 
Commission of the European Union, for instance, stated in 
2000 that, in cases of the release of rays or toxins or in the 
case of massive clearance, the burden of proof lies with 
the proponents of those actions. The underlying argument 
seems to say that, in the case in which the ‘heuristics of fear’ 
argues for possible danger related to the development or 
the application of a new technology, the release of possibly 
dangerous substances or a grave intervention into the 
environment, the burden of proof lies not with those who 
state the danger but with those who propose the disputed 
activity. That creates the impression that the proponents of a 
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new technology, a new vaccine or whatsoever have to prove 
that there is no risk involved. 
The requirements set out in the previous paragraph would 
indeed lead to a self-contradictory result. Without arguing 
for a zero-risk concept in general, a proof for zero-risk would 
be required in every single case in which an interested group 
appeals to the precautionary principle. For that reason, Cass 
Sunstein, a legal scholar who became the administrator of the 
White House Office for Information and Regulatory Affairs 
under President Obama, strongly opposed the precautionary 
principle (Sunstein 2005). He criticises not only a tendency 
towards a zero-risk illusion but also the focus on the worst-
case scenario independent of its probability. 
At this point, a digression on the worst-case scenario 
should be added. It has to be remembered that the worst-
case scenario originally was a strategic concept of military 
planning. The arms race during the Cold War was dictated 
on both sides by this scenario. Every side had to be prepared 
against a massive attack from the other side, including means 
of mass destruction. So every side wanted to have a second-
strike capability. A system of mutual assured destruction 
(MAD) was created. 
In the war against terror, the United States of Amercia (USA) 
followed this tradition of worst-case thinking. United States 
(US) Vice-President, Dick Cheney, proclaimed in November 
2001 the so called 1% doctrine stating that, even in the case of 
a 1% possibility of a nuclear bomb being available to the al-
Qa’ida terrorists, the US had to treat it ‘as a certainty in terms 
of our response’ (Fox Keller 2011:5; see Suskind 2006). 
Sunstein evidently does not like to transfer this kind of 
idea to environmental politics. Instead, he reinforces a 
political atmosphere that uses worst-case scenarios in the 
field of terrorism but not with regard to climate change, 
environmental degradation or excesses on the financial 
markets. Therefore, he insists that regulatory policy, as he 
has to stand for in the White House, has to be based only 
on expert judgement, that is rationality, and not on popular 
sentiment, that is emotion. 
With this he falls back onto a problematic alternative. Emotion 
can be found not only on the side of ordinary citizens but also 
on the side of experts. Furthermore, rationality is not only to 
be found on the side of ‘differential equations’ but also on the 
side of ‘gaze heuristics’. Sunstein’s criticism is nevertheless 
helpful insofar as it warns us not to fall into another equally 
wrong alternative, namely to put the burden of proof on 
either the proponents or the opponents of a certain activity. 
It rather seems that both perspectives have to be brought into 
a public discourse and into a transparent and participatory 
decision-making process. In the end, a political consideration 
on ethical grounds will have to decide which side will be 
given greater weight. 
The weight of damages
Even under the assumption that the precautionary principle 
is applied, the procedure of experts would normally be, as 
described before, to calculate the mathematical expectation 
by multiplying the estimated magnitude of future risks with 
their estimated probability. Already the fact that we have 
to include estimations in both factors of this mathematical 
product makes clear that even this procedure with its 
pretended objectivity is to a high degree susceptible to 
subjective evaluations, to tendentious judgements, to the 
promotion of prejudices or even to emotions under the veil of 
objectivity. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify whether this is 
the only way of rational procedure. For that purpose, the most 
important point seems to be that every rational procedure has 
to be open for iterative processes, for self-critical evaluations 
and for the revision of previous results. Even in theories on 
economic decision making, the interconnectedness between 
irreversibility and uncertainty was introduced as a new 
aspect. 
Under the conditions of uncertainty, a special kind of 
caution is needed with regard to actions with irreversible 
consequences. We have to add: This irreversibility has to 
do not only with the life conditions of present but also of 
future generations. Actions with irreversible consequences 
require a high degree of precaution, even if a high degree of 
uncertainty is involved (see Gollier, Jullien & Treich 2000). 
The interconnectedness between irreversibility and uncertainty 
is the reason why the heuristics of fear apply to actions with 
high risk even if only a low probability is assigned to them. As 
the German Ethics Committee on Safe Energy Supply stated, 
there is no imperative for a rational procedure that turns the 
mathematical expectancy of the available alternatives into the 
decisive point of reference for a final decision. It is a rational 
decision to categorise hazards with a higher magnitude and 
lower probability as more serious than hazards with a lower 
magnitude and higher probability. It is a question of public 
ethics that will determine which level of risk a society will 
take, for instance, for its energy supply. It is even more a 
question of public ethics that will determine which level of 
risk a society will take on behalf of the next generations. 
Perils of precaution 
The last point of criticism addresses the insight, from another 
angle, that there is no zero-risk society. The criticism was 
coined by Max More, a rather eccentric philosopher and 
partisan of Ray Kurzweil, into the precise formula of the 
‘perils of precaution’ (More 2010). He presents a long list of 
achievements of science and technology that became possible 
only by way of taking risks. The list starts with A for airplane 
and Aspirin and presents at the end the vaccines for rabies, 
measles, polio and smallpox. Max More is convinced that, in 
all these cases, the fear of possible side effects would have 
alarmed the application of the precautionary principle and 
would eventually have hindered a breakthrough in scientific 
and technological progress. More states: ‘The principle 
endangers us by trying too hard to safeguard us.’
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There may be some reasons to issue a warning about the 
excessive use of the precautionary principle. There is, 
for instance, an ongoing debate about whether or not the 
critique of green genetic engineering in some countries (like 
Germany) is exaggerated. However, this kind of debate 
has nothing to do with the principle itself but only with its 
reasonable application. 
Conclusion 
In the interpretation given in the precedent paragraphs, the 
precautionary principle is applicable if there are reasons 
to weight higher risks with a lower probability stronger 
than lower risks with a higher probability. In those cases, 
the uncertainty of the assessment of future risks has to be 
balanced with the irreversibility of possible effects. The 
consideration also has to take into account the possible 
benefits of a proposed activity and the possible achievements 
of new technologies or of a scientific progress. The lesson of 
Fukushima is that even a low probability of a core meltdown 
in a nuclear reactor provides reason for the search for 
alternatives to the use of those reactors for energy supply. 
The answer has, however, to take into account the effects of 
carbon dioxide on the global climate. Therefore, a careful use 
of energy, higher energy efficiency and renewable energy 
resources are preferable options.
The precautionary principle is not in itself a sufficient 
principle on which to take decisions. It is rather a regulative 
idea or a criterion under which proposed activities have 
to be considered and alternatives have to be developed. 
It expresses respect for the sanctity of life and for the life 
conditions of future generations. In this way, it applies to 
the technological era the imperative not to harm. It takes 
prospective responsibility seriously and searches for ways to 
sustainable development. 
Since the Brundtland-Report of 1987 (World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987), sustainability includes 
three dimensions: intact environment, social justice and a 
stable economy. Although these three dimensions already 
present different aspects of sustainable development, the 
dimension of cultural communication should be added. 
The world’s cultural heritage and its preservation for future 
generations, the work on new forms of cultural expression 
and the dialogue of cultures in a multicultural world are not 
nice to have but essential for the future of humankind. 
The precautionary principle is primarily applied where 
dangers for human health, for biodiversity and for the 
natural environment are at stake. In its application, all four 
dimensions of sustainable development have to be taken 
into consideration: intact environment, social justice, stable 
economy and cultural communication. 
Acknowledgement
Competing interests
The author declares that he has no financial or personal 
relationship(s) which may have inappropriately influenced 
him in writing this paper. 
References
Dawkins, R., 1976, The Selfish Gene, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
De Villiers, E., 2002, ‘Who will bear moral responsibility?’ Communicatio 28, 16–21 
from http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02500160208537953
De Villiers, E., 2003, ‘A Christian ethics of responsibility: Does it provide an adequate 
theoretical framework for dealing with issues of public morality?’ Scriptura 82, 
23–38.
De Villiers, E., 2006, ‘Prospects of a Christian ethics of responsibility (Part 1): An 
assessment of an American version’ Verbum et Ecclesia 27(2), 468–487.
De Villiers, E., 2007a, ‘Prospects of a Christian ethics of responsibility (Part 2): An 
assessment of three German versions’ Verbum et Ecclesia 28(1), 88–109.
De Villiers, E., 2007b, ‘Perspektiven einer christlichen Verantwortungsethik’ Zeitschrift 
für Evangelische Ethik 51(1), 8–23.
De Villiers, E., 2010, ‘The recognition of human dignity in Africa: A Christian ethics of 
responsibility perspective’ Scriptura 104, 163–178.
De Villiers, E., 2011a, ‘An ethics of responsibility reading of Eduard Tödt’s theory on 
the formation of moral judgements’ in L. Hansen, N. Koopman, R. Vosloo (eds.), 
Living Theology: Essays presented to Dirk J. Smit on his sixtieth birthday, pp. 468–
480, Bible Media, Wellington. 
De Villiers, E., 2011b, ‘Prophetic witness: An appropriate mode of public discourse 
in the democratic South Africa?’ in H. Bedford-Strohm & E. de Villiers (eds.), 
Prophetic Witness: An Appropriate Contemporary Mode of Public Discourse?, pp. 
161–180, Lit-Verlag, Münster. 
Ethikkommission Sichere Energieversorgung 2011, Deutschlands Energiewende – Ein 
Gemeinschaftswerk für die Zukunft, Bundesregierung, Berlin.
European Commission, 2000, Communication on the precautionary principle of 
February 2, 2000, European Commission, Brussels.
European Union, 1992, ‘Article 130r’ in Maastricht Treaty, European Union, 
Maastricht. 
Fox Keller, E., 2011, What is a rational response to catastrophic risk? STIAS Lecture, 
Stellenbosch.
Gigerenzer, G., 2007, Gut feelings: Short cuts to better decision making, Penguin 
Books, New York.
Gollier, C., Jullien, B. & Treich, N., 2000, ‘Scientific progress and irreversibility: An 
economic interpretation of the ‘precautionary principle’, Journal of Public 
Economics 75, 229–253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00052-3
Jonas, H., 1979, Das Prinzip Verantwortung: Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische 
Zivilisation, Insel, Frankfurt. 
Jonas, H., 1984, The imperative of responsibility: In search for an ethics for the 
technological age, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
Jonas, H., 1987, Der Gottesbegriff nach Auschwitz: Eine jüdische Stimme, Suhrkamp, 
Frankfurt.
More, M., 2010, The Perils of Precaution, viewed 06 April 2012, from www.maxmore.
com/perils.htm. 
Picht, G., 1980, ‘Die Zeit und die Modalitäten’ in G. Picht, Hier und Jetzt: Philosophieren 
nach Auschwitz und Hiroshima I, n.p., Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart.
Sunstein, C.R., 2005, The laws of fear: Beyond the precautionary principle, Cambridge 
University Press, New York. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511790850
Suskind, R., 2006, The one percent doctrine. Deep inside America’s pursuit of its 
enemies since 9/11, Simon & Schuster, New York.
United Nations General Assembly, 1992, ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development’, in Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 03–14, 1992, viewed n.d., from http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm/
Weber, M., 1994, Wissenschaft als Beruf 1917/1919. Politik als Beruf 1919: 
Studienausgabe, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen.
World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, Our Common Future, 
United Nations Organisation, New York.
